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JUDICIAL TAX COURTS FOR THE STATES:
A MODERN IMPERATIVE
William D. Dexter*
1. Introduction
There has been growing discontent among tax gatherers and taxpayers alike over the disposition of state and local tax disputes.' Concern
centers on the nature of appellate review and its availability irrespective
of the tax involved or the amount or subject matter in controversy. In
many jurisdictions the system of review in tax cases presents an unwieldy
array of alternative administrative and judicial avenues of review which
are confusing to the prospective tax appellant and destructive of economy
and uniformity in the system. This article will assess the need for a
specialized judicial court to review the initial disposition of tax matters.
Any review of tax matters should have as its objectives:
(1) Equity to individual taxpayers and
among taxpayers engaged in similar
operations within any tax jurisdiction;
(2) Adequate safeguards against arbitrary
administrative action with assurance
of certainty and uniformity in application;
(3) Simplicity in resolving questions of
tax liability;
(4) Resolution of tax liability issues within a reasonable period of time;
(5) Economic feasibility; and
(6) Disposition by a competent impartial
tribunal.
*Assistant Attorney General of Michigan.
1While the rise in federal expenditures, and the concomitant rise in the "bite" taken
out of the taxpayer's earnings, have received extensive comment and have long
been the subject of national debate, the soaring income and expenditures of
local units of government have gone relatively unnoticed. Figures released last
summer from a joint Senate-House study of income, taxation, and expenditures
in the states indicate that state and local taxes over the ten-year period from
1955 to 1965 more than doubled, increasing from some $23.5 billion to $51.2
billion. It is estimated that combined state expenditures in three years will
exceed $103 billion, or as much as the federal government spent in the fiscal
year 1964.
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It has been a long-standing rule that a state may not exact a tax from
its citizens without satisfying the requisites of constitutional due process.
Therefore, each state has conformed its existing tax structure at least to
the minimal standards of constitutional due process as set by federal and
state courts. 2 This is true even though federal courts have had only a limited opportunity to measure the state tax structure's adherence to those
standards. Review of state tax matters by federal courts has been curtailed by the provision of the Johnson Act that federal district courts shall
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any
tax under state law where a "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy may be
had in the state courts.3 The availability of review under Section 2281 of
the Federal Judicial Code is even more limited in the wake of Swift v.
WickhaM4 where the Supreme Court admonished that the broad review
provided by the three-judge panel is available only where substantial
federal questions are presented and that jurisdiction under the provision
should be construed strictly to that end.5
Given the fact that each state's tax structure therefore presumably will
reflect the "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy required by the federal
standard and will reflect due process required under its state constitution,
obviously the suggestion of an alternative and presumably "better" route
for review through a state tax court presupposes the need for more than
the requisites of minimal due process. "More" may simply mean an
easier, faster, or more manageable route. It may involve only a less
costly method of review which is of prime importance to the taxpayer
with a small amount of tax at issue. This insistence on the right of
judicial review of tax questions, even though there is concurrently available review by an administrative agency, can only be explained by that
feature of impartiality and objectivity attributed peculiarly to a full-fledged
court. This attitude has not developed without factual justification, for
the safeguards found in the judicial process are often not required in the
administrative process, particularly on a state and local level. Therefore it
can be urged that judicial tax review should be used to whatever extent is
practicable. Disposition of controversies through administrative review
should be held to a minimum, dictated primarily by the amount in controversy. This would clearly maximize the effectiveness of the judicial check
on the administrative process.
To the extent that the stated objectives can be realized better by a tax
court than by the present system of administrative and judicial review of
See Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943); Carbonneau Industries Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 198 F. Supp. 629 (W.D.
Mich. 1961).
328 U.S.C. §1341 (1952).
4382 U.S. 111 (1965).
5 For a recent application of that rule to a tax matter, see Kuhn v. State of Michigan
Civil Action No. 30179 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 5, 1967), decided by a three-judge
panel.
2
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initial tax dispositions, the creation of a tax court in any state is amply
justified. Significant advantages can be achieved by the creation of such
a court, for it would:
(1) Promote a higher level of judicial
competence in an increasingly complex and technical field of law;
(2) Help to prevent a multiplicity of tax
litigation;
(3) Provide for a more uniform administration and enforcement of the revenue and tax laws of the state;
(4) Result in a speedier determination
of tax litigation;
(5) Provide judicial review which, in
comparison to the many existing
methods of judicial review now permitted, would be more direct and
less expensive to the taxpayer and
to the state;
(6) Simplify judicial review procedures
and eliminate the choice of forum or
remedy allowed by the availability of
alternative methods of review open
to the ex parte choice of the initiating party.
These suggested advantages must be appraised in the light of existing
patterns of administrative and judicial review which not only vary significantly from state to state, but also from tax to tax within the state.
II. Existing Patterns of Review of Tax Matters

A. An Overview
Historically each new tax statute has provided for some form of review
process in addition to judicial review. The need for expertise in a
particular tax area has led to the creation of specific and limited tax
review bodies, generally administrative in nature and composed of individuals who possess some sort of special competence in tax matters. Commonly a second review-body is created which is quasi-judicial in nature but
with administrative finality in its decision. A specific appeal route to a
court of record in the state court system will typically then be provided,
perhaps with further review granted on appeal from that court. In practice
the actual scope of the appellate review at any stage of the process is not
clearly delineated, nor is this review coordinated with other existing forms
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of tax review. As the "patchwork quilt" character of the various review
processes has become more evident, legislatures have responded with
various "reorganization plans" in an attempt to standardize hearing procedures before reviewing bodies and appeals from them. The Uniform
Administrative Procedure Act is an example. 6 It superimposes a new
administrative review and appeal procedure on the existing patterns. With
the taxpayer striving to open new appeal routes in the hope of securing
a more favorable, more efficient, or more convenient appeal route, it is
apparent that such a patchwork will not adequately fulfill the purposes
of review. Certainty and uniformity in the application of the tax laws
are lost under this patchwork. The ease of challenging a specific imposition
disappears, and correspondingly the advantages of forum shopping increase.
As the review process becomes less predictable and more complex, the
safeguards against arbitrary administrative action and other deprivations
of procedural and substantive due process cease to provide meaningful
protection. The taxpayer with a small amount of tax in controversy is
denied an economically feasible method of contesting questionable tax
liability.

B. The Michigan Example
The need for a tax court to replace the existing patchwork system of
tax review can be illustrated by reference to current procedures in
Michigan.
There are marked differences in administrative and judicial review of
tax matters depending upon the tax, the administrative agency involved,
the choice of forum, the stage in the review process at which judicial
review is sought, and whether judicial relief is sought before or after
payment. For example, the scope of judicial review of property tax
matters is different from judicial review of other taxes. Review varies with
the nature of the taxpayer's objection to the tax. Review depends on
whether appeal to the courts is before or after appeal to the Michigan
State Tax Commission. The availability and nature of judicial relief
depends on whether the tax in controversy has been paid. If property
taxes are paid under protest and refund is sought because the tax is
claimed to be "illegal," suit may be instituted in the Circuit Court for
refund prior to appeal to the Commission. Alternatively the taxpayer can
elect not to pay the tax and appeal to the Commission. If the tax is
claimed to be excessive but not illegal, the taxpayer is generally required
to appeal to the Commission prior to resort to the court. Judicial review
in the latter instance is in the Court of Appeals and limited to review of
claims of fraud or illegality on the part of the Commission.7
6 MICH. COMP. LAws §24.101 et seq. (1952).
7 Under ARTICLE VI, §28, MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION (1963): "In the absence of fraud,
error of law or the adoption of wrong principles, no appeal may be taken to
any court from any final agency provided for the administration of 'property
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The tax laws administered by the Revenue Division of the Treasury
Department provide that, with the exception of inheritance and local
income tax matters, a taxpayer may appeal from any order or determination of the Revenue Division to the Board of Tax Appeals, created by the
Department of Revenue Act of 1941,8 or may have any other appropriate
remedy provided by law. Many of the tax statutes specifically allow a suit
for a refund of money already paid to be brought directly in the Circuit
Court (general trial court) in the locality where the taxpayer does business. "Any appropriate remedy provided by law" also includes the right
generally to pay taxes and sue in the Court of Claims for refund, the
right to proceed for a declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court, and the
right to resort to the extraordinary remedies provided by direct appeal to
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Michigan.
In the inheritance tax field, matters are usually determined by the
Probate judge on the recommendation of an account examiner of the
Revenue Division. If questions arise as to the levy of the inheritance tax
on the estate, they may be resolved by a petition in the Probate Court,
with review of that decision on appeal to the Circuit Court. Since the rate
of the Michigan inheritance tax is low, many of these controversies involve very small amounts. This has resulted in a very limited review of
these questions by appellate courts, and consequently, in many areas of
inheritance tax enforcement there are no appellate decisions. Since it is
inconceivable that all eighty-three counties in Michigan are applying the
inheritance tax law in accordance with any common standard, it is fair to
conclude that as to the inheritance tax there is nonuniform enforcement
of the tax. 9
Two examples rather vividly portray the complexity of present methods
of review. In 1960 the same substantive question concerning the jurisdictional reach and constitutionality of the Michigan business activities tax
was pending simultaneously before numerous Circuit Court judges, the
Court of Claims, the State Board of Tax Appeals, the Supreme Court of
Michigan, and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan. Each of these tribunals with the exception of the Michigan
Supreme Court was ostensibly exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the
tax laws from any decision relating to valuation or allocation." This is in
accordance with the GENERAL PROPERTY TAX ACT, MICH. COMP. LAWS §211.152
(1948) and with judicial decisions on point. See S. S. Kresge Co. v. City of
Detroit, 276 Mich. 565, 268 N.W. 740 (1936); Kingsford Chemical Co. v. City
of Kingsford, 347 Mich. 91, 78 N.W.2d 587 (1956). For an excellent discussion
of the application of this principle to the existing review routes and the conclusion
that the review provided by the GENERAL PROPERTY TAX ACT and other law
is woefully inadequate, see Krawood, Michigan's Need for a Tax Court and
the Inadequacy of Appeal Procedures Provided by the General Property Tax
Law, I1WAYNE L. REv. 508 (1965).
8MICH. COMP. LAWS §205.1 et seq. (1948).
9 This same pattern is generally applicable in the determination and enforcement of
liability for the mentally ill or retarded in State institutions.
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same substantive question. Most of these cases were pending before
judges whose crowded dockets made it extremely difficult for them to
handle complicated and protracted tax litigation.
The second and more recent example of the confusion that results from
a variety of review processes in tax matters is found in the history of
litigation between the State of Michigan and The Detroit Edison Company concerning liability for the corporate franchise tax. Under Michigan corporation law, a corporation, believing itself to be aggrieved by
a determination of its liability for the corporate franchise tax imposed
by the Corporation Fees, Tax and Charges Act,10 may apply to the
Corporation and Securities Commission for a redetermination of the
franchise liability. Under Section 9 of that Act,1 1 a further appeal may
then be taken to the corporation tax appeal board, and within thirty days
of the decision of that body either party may appeal "from the decision of
the appeal board to the supreme court of the state." Conceding that, under
the General Court Rules of 1963 promulgated by the Michigan Supreme
Court, jurisdiction for this appeal might be lodged in the Court of Appeals,
such jurisdiction was created subsequent to the last amendment of the
statute in question, and it could be argued, as the State in fact did argue,
that the appeal route there established was the only appeal route provided
or available. This would follow from the legislative intent seemingly
apparent in Section 9. However, in The Detroit Edison Co. v. State of
Michigan,12 the corporate taxpayer established its right to sue in the Court
of Claims for recovery of franchise taxes paid under protest without first
appealing to the corporation tax appeal board. The majority opinion
saw the issue as an abuse of administrative discretion by the Commission
in attempting to hold the claim in abeyance until the same question for a
prior year was resolved in the appeal pending before the tax appeal
board where it affected the corporation's right to get a "certificate of good
standing." The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Carr met the issue from
a different point of view. The appeal remedy provided by Section 9 of
the Corporation Fees, Taxes and Charges Act could net be and was not
the exclusive appeal route:
It is significant that the legislature did
not specify that the remedies to a corporation, thereby afforded, would be exclusive.
In view of the decision of this Court in
in re Consolidated Freight Co., 265 Mich.
340, 348 (4 PUR NS 397), it may be
assumed that the legislature intended that
the review in this court should be confined wholly to questions of law, in other
10 MICH. COMP. LAWS §450.301 (1948).
11 d. at §450.309.

12 361 Mich. 290, 105 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
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words, an appeal in the nature of certiorari. If, therefore, the statutory procedure under the 1954 act, above cited,
is exclusive, a corporation considering itself aggrieved by being required to pay
the amount of the franchise fee as fixed
by the commission has no remedy by
which the factual issues can be tried in
court. Such result is not consistent with
the general property tax law . . . allowing
the payment of taxes under protest, with
the right to sue to recover such payments.
Had it been the intention of the legislature in the enactment of P.A. 1954, No.
153, to deprive corporations of the right
recognized in Consumers Power Company
v. Corporation & Securities Commission,
326 Mich. 643 (16 ALR2d 1084), to
bring action in the court of claims to recover a franchise fee paid under protest,
we think such intent would have been
clearly expressed. The administrative procedures as provided in said amendatory
act are not inconsistent with the right to
sue in the court of claims, the review of
such procedure being limited to questions
of law only .... 13

In 1962, the Court of Claims decided that Edison did have a right to
recover the franchise taxes which it had paid under protest.1 4 In 1966, the
Corporation and Securities Commission, on the theory that the 1962
judgment was not binding for subsequent tax years, assessed a deficiency
determination against Edison. Edison, after requesting a redetermination
of the deficiency, commenced an action in the Ingham County Circuit
Court by filing a "Complaint (in the nature of a petition)" asking that
deficiency assessments be vacated and set aside. Jurisdiction in the Ingham
County Circuit Court was founded upon the Administrative Procedure
Act of Michigan. 1 5 Under Section 8 of the Act, 16 an aggrieved party in
a "contested case" before an administrative agency may sue in a Circuit
Court by a complaint in the nature of a petition to have the order of the
13 Id. at 307, 105 N.W.2d at 236.
14 Detroit Edison Co. v. Corporation and Securities Commission, 367 Mich. 104, 116
N.W.2d 194 (1962).
15 See note 6 supra.
16 MICH. COMP. LAws §24.108 (1952).
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agency set aside. Rejecting the State's argument that the court had no
jurisdiction to hear the petition, the Ingham County Circuit Court denied
the state's motion for accelerated judgment. 17
The lesson to be gleaned from the Edison cases is clear: the "patchwork
quilt" of judicial review can only lead to confusion, inconsistency, and
unreliability. Moreover, the expansion of judicial review avenues in this
patchwork manner is nearly inevitable under the existing Michigan statutes
for judicial review of tax assessments. As long as the avenues are open,
good faith litigants will use them. Yet the benefits that accrue to the
litigant who can make his own ex parte selection of an appeal route will
not necessarily be conducive to the evolution of a consistent and just
body of tax law nor to an economic method of pursuing it. The confusion and needless expenditure of legal effort, such as that involved
in the Edison cases or in disputes over liability for the business activities
tax, can be avoided by a speedy, orderly, and uniform remedy for the
taxpayer.
Quite apart from the problems of multiplicity and uncertainty in tax
review, Michigan experience has demonstrated the very practical problem
of judicial competence in the adjudication of tax cases which require
specialized knowledge gained only by experience in the tax field and by
repeated exposure to comparable problems. Tax specialization has been
recognized among practicing lawyers for years because of the need for
such detailed knowledge. In most instances the general practicing lawyer considers himself incompetent to handle complicated tax matters.
The scattering of these specialized questions among the many forums
available in the state judicial and administrative structure places an undue
burden on the judge lacking special competence in tax matters and therefore on the judicial system.
The complete lack of uniformity in tax administration and enforcement
to which the existing patchwork has led means that a taxpayer never
knows at what stage of the review process he should obtain judicial review
of a tax controversy or in what forum he should adjudicate it in order to
secure maximum benefit of the review process. He needs the best legal
counsel simply to figure out his path and timing. These uncertainties suggest the need to focus on the questions most relevant to the simplification
of the procedural maze.

III. What Should Be the Scope and Availability of Judicial
Review?
Michigan case law suggests that current judicial attitudes favor the
expansion rather than the contraction of judicial review of tax matters.
17 Trial court decision reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, August 29, 1968,

Calendar No. 3847; leave to appeal filed with the Supreme Court September 18,
1968, Calendar No. 52183.

December 19681

State Tax Courts

This is part of the increasing concern over what constitutes "due process." More formal and exacting review procedures on the administrative level have been required, and at the same time judicial review of tax
matters has expanded in spite of the administrative finality rule. If every
taxpayer is entitled to judicial review of all tax questions in any tax
controversy, a serious question is raised concerning the purpose of an
administrative appeal agency discharging the quasi-judicial function. Although the expanded function of both the courts and administrative
agencies in the process of reviewing tax controversies has grown out of the
same concern for impartial competent review, one or the other is really
unnecessary assuming that disposition of contested matters by an administrative agency is to be subject to the same rules as disposition by a court.
For example, where a tax matter is handled as a "contested case" under
the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act,1 8 which requires the preparation of a formal record, findings of fact and conclusions of law by the
administrative agency and which limits judicial review to the correction of
legal errors, judicial review will involve a judicial function different from
the trial de novo of a complex tax controversy. Under the Act, the review
is based on the presupposition that the responsibilities related to factfinding and subject matter expertise are discharged by the administrative
body. As a matter of practice, however, it is not so easy to distinguish
between a question of fact and a question of law nor to determine how
mixed questions of fact and law are to be handled. How is the administrative agency to treat what it identifies as legal questions that are inextricably bound up in the administrative disposition of a contested case?
May we conclude that the quasi-judicial administrative function as a matter
of practice is readily distinguishable from the judicial function? Does not
limited judicial review, such as that prescribed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, effectively require the same knowledge and competence
in tax matters as that possessed by the de novo trier of fact? In the last
analysis, therefore, does the rule of administrative finality and limited
judicial review actually serve to promote a "plain, speedy and efficient"
remedy, constructively separating a judicial function from a distinct administrative function in tax matters? To the extent that a distinction of
expertise is accorded administrative review by the judiciary, how much of
this recognition is motivated by lack of interest and time to devote to
complex tax questions? This writer's experience indicates that the respective roles of the courts and administrative review agencies depend in
large measure on judicial attitudes toward the impartiality and competency
of the administrative review agency and the court's interest in the subject
of taxation.
This is not to say that certain questions are not better resolved finally
on the administrative level. But the rule of administrative finality is not
18 MICH. COMP. LAWS

§24.104 et seq. (1952).
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restricted to these questions. It is effectively a rule of expediency and, if
we accept this, we must recognize two corollaries both of which are
destructive of the just and efficient administration of tax law. First, as
the question submitted to the administrative agency becomes relatively
more important to the citizen involved and to the political framework
within which it is posed, expediency will become less acceptable and
different results will follow. Second, it is clear that a rule of expediency
cannot peacefully coexist with a deeply felt sense that the courts should
have the last word in the administration of justice.1" To the extent that
they do coexist, the two principles are bound to live in tension with each
other. The proposal for a judicial tax court is aimed precisely at this
tension. With the growing importance of substantive tax law on the state
and local level the ordinary rules applicable to the administrative process
are being rejected in favor of a more thoroughly judicial review process.
Significantly the motivation to create a form of judicial tax review as
opposed to the administrative review process has come as much from
government as from private sources. It is perhaps overlooked by the
taxpayer that the tax administrator has as much or more interest in the
conflict resolution process than the taxpayer himself. Undoubtedly a part
of his interest stems from his concern, like that of any other taxpayer,
that efficient methods of applying equal justice are evolved. The tax
administrator, however, also has less altruistic motives for desiring to
perfect the conflict resolution process. Certainly the job of the tax administrator is facilitated when he can anticipate the procedural route in
which an appeal will be taken, and does not have to cover all the possible
"bets" on tho judicial "board." To the extent that the procedural battles
are minimized, moreover, he may focus his attention on the sound
development of a state or local tax policy.
Ironically it is popular opposition to the concept of a tax court which
largely prevents its realization. Such resistance derives from two seemingly
opposite tendencies. On the one hand, resistance to such a state tax court
19 Judge Peter M. Gunnar, first judge of the Oregon Tax Court and for years a
pioneer in the enactment of tax court legislation, has summed up the problem
thus:
Regardless of the breadth of administrative discretion as propounded by our courts, most
Americans, tax men and taxpayers alike, inherently believe that a citizen has his right to a
day in court before his property and the product
of his labor may be taken from him. We have
recognized that to protect the individual from
the unconstitutional exercise of the legislative
power, and more frequently from the illegal
or improper exercise of executive power, is the
function of the courts in the last resort.

Gunnar, Oregon's Unique Tax Court in

REVENUE ADMINISTRATION

at 17, (1962).
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comes from those taxpayers who wish to maximize the "sporting theory of
justice" by retaining a system that encourages piecemeal solution and depends more upon the time and place of filing the complaint than upon the
merits of the controversy. On the other hand, there is a suspicion that
some popular resistance to the idea of a judicial tax court stems from an
unarticulated fear that it would become, not a real court of law, but somehow more a summary process for determining tax liability after the fashion
of the infamous Star Chamber of medieval England.
If we believe that forum shopping and alternative avenues of appeal
contribute significantly to the impossibility of uniform and equitable
applications of rules of law, it is clear that the "sporting theory of justice"
is inconsistent with the goals sought in the administration of the tax laws.
If there is a choice of forum or other remedy, a taxpayer's counsel is
certainly under an obligation to choose the one best suited to his client's
needs. However, when the complexity of procedural rules and the array
of open avenues permit the taxpayer to avoid just taxation or the state
to tax the taxpayer unjustly, then the rules have become so subject to
abuse that a basic change in the rules is required.
It is common knowledge that many Circuit Court judges have openly
expressed the desire to be rid of tax matters that are extremely complicated
in nature and may be brought to them very infrequently. It seems evident,
therefore, that the creation of a specialized tax court placing a premium
on the expertise of its personnel will provide a more competent forum for
the review of these questions while simultaneously ensuring that a fullfledged court will have the final word on just administration of the tax laws.
A glance at the nationwide picture of state tax patterns will suggest
that the need for a forum of specialized judicial review in state tax matters is even overdue. As of August 1968, forty-four states had a sales tax;
forty-four had a use tax; forty-nine had a cigarette tax; all fifty had a
gasoline tax; thirty-eight had an individual income tax; and forty-one levied
on corporate income. The states generally have agreements with sister
states for reciprocal enforcement of tax provisions, Michigan having such
an agreement with thirty-six states. Thirty-one states and the District of
Columbia have both a sales and an income tax structure. 20 With the
existing tax structure as complex as even this quick summary indicates,
with the inevitable expansion of state taxation of interstate business as a
result of recent decisions clarifying the states' rights in this area, 2 1 and
with the continued expansion of the demand for state services, the forecast
for the economic growth of the states highlights the need for better tax
assessment and review procedures. The growing economic importance of
state and local tax questions makes for a modern imperative that some
simpler, systematized, rational approach to the settlement of these questions
2
21

Research Section, Revenue Division, Department of Treasury, State of Michigan.
Scripto Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Northwestern States Portland Cement
Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).

Prospectus

[Vol. 2:1

replace the existing patchwork of conflict resolution now prevalent in a
great number of states.
IV. The Judicial Tax Court With Exclusive Jurisdiction
The objectives of tax review can best be met by creating a judicial tax
court with exclusive jurisdiction. This conclusion is controversial both in
concept and in practicality. It is premised on the writer's experience that
courts of general jurisdiction that do not specialize in disposition of
tax cases generally desire to be rid of tax controversies, particularly
the complicated and time-consuming ones. It is also based on the experience that most trial courts of general jurisdiction lack the competence
to deal with the kind of tax problems that are usually presented at the
judicial level, either as a result of lack of interest, time or background.
It is also based on the recognition, however, that unquestionably part of
the process of determining tax liability will involve some administrative
review. The proposed judicial tax court would be as much a part of the
court system of the state as the general trial courts or appellate courts, but
it would possess specialized expertise in tax matters and would be limited
in its jurisdiction to the review of tax liability cases. It would be possible
to rely on an independent administrative body rather than a full-fledged
judicial court of general jurisdiction, if such a body exercised a judicial
function under proper safeguards for its impartiality. Ostensibly independent review agencies concerned exclusively with the review of state
and local tax disputes have been established in at least fifteen states. 22
A brief discussion of the relative merits of such an independent review
agency and the judicial tax court is therefore in order.
Typically the independent review agency will be provided by statute as
the specific appeal route, following the initial determination of tax liability
and perhaps a redetermination at the request of the taxpayer. The review
agency will generally be authorized to promulgate its own rules of
practice. 2 3 The review board will typically be placed within the administrative framework of some department of the state, but will be
regarded under the statutes as independent, according to statutory statements of varying force and effect. For example, Massachusetts law provides that "There shall be in the department of corporations and taxation,
but in no manner subject to the control of the said department, an
appellate tax board ...."24 Of course the jurisdiction of the tax board will
be spelled out in the statutes and the rules; generally an appeal to a court
22 Fifteen States Have Independent Review Agencies, 28 TAx ADMINISTRATORS NEWS
61 (1964).
23 Cf. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE OF THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS, State
of Louisiana pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. §47:1413 (1950); RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, APPELLATE TAX BOARD, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 58A, §1 (1965).
24 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 58A, §1 (1965).
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will be provided from the decision of the board. The rules of practice and
procedure promulgated by the board will deal typically with the entire
process of filing an appeal, drafting such written materials as may be
required, identifying the parties to the action, defining who may practice
before the board, and other procedures.
There seems little doubt that one of the great virtues of the administrative tax appeal board in practice is its ability to promulgate procedural
rules best adapted to the management of the matter presented. Thus,
under most rules of practice, the taxpayer may represent himself before
the board or have an attorney act for him. Certified public accountants
and attorneys from other states may be permitted to practice under
certain circumstances and in certain matters on behalf of the taxpayer. 2 5
The rules generally provide for an informal hearing of argument and the
issuance of written findings of fact and law. Such rules are generally
calculated to make the taxpayer feel at ease in an informal hearing aimed
at a full development of the facts with a minimum of procedural roadblocks.
The real character of any particular appeal board, however, is dependent
upon a variety of imponderables. The Massachusetts board, for example,
is expressly declared by the statute to be an agency of the Department
of Corporations, "but in no manner subject to the control of the said
department.
...
26 It exercises concurrent jurisdiction over tax matters
with the Massachusetts Superior Court, 27 but its, findings are final and
subject to review by the Supreme Judicial Court only in cases of errors of
law. 28 Although the remedy provided by the board is said to be exclusive,2 9 courts of equity may grant declaratory relief as a discretionary
matter under certain limited circumstances. 3 0 Although its independence
is less clearly secure in practice, the Massachusetts appellate tax board
is about as close to a genuine tax court as it is possible to conceive and it
was in fact so declared by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 3 1
The Michigan corporation tax appeal board, created to review corporate franchise tax matters, may provide a comparison to the Massachusetts board. The corporation tax appeal board is composed of the
Attorney General of the State as chairman, the Auditor General and the
State Treasurer. 32 Findings of fact by the board have been held to be
25 Cf. Rule No.

1, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND

PRACTICE OF THE BOARD OF TAX

APPEALS, State of Louisiana pursuant to LA. REV. STAT.
Rule

No.

APPEALS,

21, RULES

OF

PROCEDURE

AND

PRACTICE

OF

§47:1413

THE

BOARD

(1950);
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26 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 58A, §1 (1965).
1d. at ch. 213, §IA (1962).
2
8Id.at ch. 58A, §13 (1965); ch. 30A, §14(8) (1957).
29
1d. at ch. 62, §48 (1921).
30 Madden v. State Tax Commission, 333 Mass. 734, 133 N.E.2d 252 (1956).
31 Cohen v. Assessors of Boston, 344 Mass. 268, 182 N.E.2d 138 (1962).
27

32 MICH. COMP. LAWS §450.309 (1948).
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binding upon the Supreme Court if supported by competent evidence. 33
The statute creating it provides that "The Commission and/or the corporation may . . . appeal from the decision of the appeal board to the
supreme court of the state." 34 We have discussed the fact, however, that
the corporation tax appeal board is not regarded as the exclusive remedy
for the taxpayer,.and the circumvention of its jurisdiction by the taxpayers
of the State undercuts the force or effect of its rulings in creating firm tax
policy. In addition there is serious doubt that this review function can be
appropriately discharged by State officials sitting ex officio.
Unless the review agency is clearly surrounded by the safeguards of
judicial due process, the basic notion that judicial review should also be
available constitutes a principal drawback to such an agency: reviewing
bodies are unnecessarily multiplied in order to ensure judicial safeguards.
Taken together with the right to a jury trial of pure fact questions, these
circumstances dictate the creation of a tax court of general jurisdiction
rather than a quasi-judicial administrative agency. The cost, delay, and
uncertainty of the remedy involved in permitting administrative action to
be reviewed alternatively or cumulatively by a quasi-judicial administrative
agency or a trial court is not justified. A tax court of general jurisdiction
is the only body capable of combining timely and uniform disposition of
tax controversies by a specialized body and the constitutional right to due
process. If the function of review is to be exercised by a court which will
develop detailed knowledge through experience gained in a specialized
forum, there is no reason to believe the review would be less competent
than that of an administrative review agency. The identification of the tax
review agency with the independence of the judiciary and the single orderly
process of appeal within the judicial system provides for the tax court a
great measure of that intangible respect and authoritativeness not reflected
in the image of an administrative review agency.
The happy compromise in blending the various assets we have discussed
would call for review by a court exclusively concerned with tax litigation
and empowered to promulgate its own rules of practice and procedure.
Essentially this is the nature of the Oregon State Tax Court 3 5 as well as
the recommendation of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the
Model State Tax Court Act ( 1957).
V. Conclusion
A state tax court of exclusive jurisdiction can provide the flexibility and
expertise of a quasi-judicial administrative agency with judicial com33Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Corporation and Securities Commission, 351 Mich.
652, 676, 88 N.W.2d 564, 570 (1958).
34 MICH. COMP. LAWS §450.309 (1948).

35 Created by the OREGON STATE COURT ACT OF 1961, ORE. REV. STAT. §305.405
et seq. (1961).
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petence and due process. The existence of this specialized court would
alleviate the necessity for providing alternative avenues for review of administrative tax determinations. The end result would much better accomplish the objectives of review set out earlier in this article, particularly
the goals of more consistent and reliable interpretations of tax law and
greater economy for the appellant.
The rapidly changing complexion of state and local taxation requires
that the states give serious thought to existing provisions for judicial
review of decisions in tax disputes. As the volume of state and local
taxation increases, as it almost certainly must do, it is imperative that
methods of review keep pace if fair and equitable application of the
revenue laws of the states is to result.
The feasibility of a judicial review process as opposed to an administrative review process will in any case depend largely upon the values placed
on independent review, the feasibility of creating another court, the caseload under the existing forms of review, the degree to which the existing
forms have fulfilled their functions and a host of other factors that depend
peculiarly upon the individual state's taxation patterns. Before statutory
changes are made these factors must be evaluated to determine the specific
requirements of each state.
In Michigan, for example, a study has been undertaken by the Taxation
Section of the State Bar Association. The results of this study are now
being considered by an advisory board including representatives from the
Department of Revenue, the Attorney General's Office, and the Law
Revision Commission. This writer is now serving with the group in an
effort to reach agreement on appropriate legislation to revise and improve
the Michigan situation where necessary. Assuming that such agreement
can be reached, provisions will probably be presented in the spring 1969
session of the Michigan Legislature.
Before any specific changes can be made, however, taxpayers and tax
administrators alike must become concerned about the shape of revenue
administration in the state. The review process must be evaluated by
comparing what we have sought to do with what in fact we have provided. A careful study of the Model State Tax Court Act and of the Oregon
Tax Court's experience 3 6 would be a most profitable supplement to this
evaluation. It is only then that the policies of equal application, uniformity, economy, and expertise that we have.posited as the basic values of
the review process can be intelligently pursued.
While careful study and evaluation are required, it should be stressed
that there is no little urgency about the matter. The processes of review
of tax disputes must be updated as rapidly as the process of taxation itself
is now developing.
36 See generally Phillips, The Oregon Tax Court: Some Thoughts on its First Decisions,
42 ORE. L. REv. 292 (1962).

